Armature, KXCO's permissioned chain, has verified ML-DSA-87, the highest security category in NIST FIPS 204, natively on chain since block 4,951,111 on 6 October 2026, as the chain's own record shows. KXCO's platform signing keys for Round Table, Guildhall, its mail platform, its platform identity and its evidence root moved to ML-DSA-87 on 6 and 7 October 2026, each one listed in the published key file.

Tokenisation at KXCO is built on that base. It lives inside Sovereign, the value layer of the stack, and settles on Armature in 2-second blocks with deterministic finality, no forks and no reorgs. Holders are admitted parties, and the configuration for regulated institutions checks transfers against the Travel Rule. The register evaluates the transfer rule before a unit moves, a named person approves on their own device, and anyone can check the signature on chain with one free call. KXCO provides the software. The licensed institution operates the environment and holds the assets. To scope a deployment, request a briefing.

Armature and tokenisation at a glance

Chain. Armature, permissioned and EVM-compatible, chain ID 1111111, QBFT across 4 validators, per the governance page.

Settlement. 2-second blocks with deterministic finality, no forks, no reorgs. Measured at 2.0000 seconds a block over 59,211 blocks on 7 October 2026, per the measurement record.

Access. Admission closed, verification open. Validator changes need 3 of 4 on-chain votes.

Signatures. ML-DSA-87 checked on chain at 0x4b58434f00000000000000000000000000000087 from block 4,951,111, per the coverage page.

Key exchange. Hybrid X25519MLKEM768 on the public endpoints, measured on 7 October 2026.

Wallets. Self-custody under the holder's own keys, with Travel Rule checks in the configuration for regulated institutions. KYC is performed by the licensed institution.

Tokenisation. Inside Sovereign. The register and capital machinery are in production, per our 19 August account.

Markets. Two global, US-licensed exchanges will add KXCO Armature. They will be announced in late 2026; detail is available under NDA.

The stack, and where tokenisation sits

Tokenisation runs through four of KXCO's seven products, on one record, and the language model stays outside all of them. Exhibit 1 draws the stack the way an institution meets it.

  • Outside: the language model. Any model the institution chooses, on its own inference endpoint. It reads and it proposes. Whether a proposal becomes an action is decided in Round Table, under authority that can only narrow.
  • Round Table: the logic. KXCO's ontology engine and the layer between the institution and the model. It holds the rules on thinking, the rules of evidence, the rules of responsibility and the chain of custody. Every claim carries its source, its basis, its confidence and its effective date, per the Round Table page.
  • Guildhall: the paper. Contracts, documents, evidence and signatures, in a room a Member controls. A fund's prospectus, its subscription agreement and its transfer restrictions live here. When a deal settles, Guildhall can connect to Sovereign or to the Member's own custodian, per the Sovereign page.
  • Sovereign: the value. The software institutions use to hold, exchange and settle value under common rules, covering FX, securities, futures, options, bonds, tokens, stablecoins and cash, per the Sovereign page.
  • Armature: the record. A permissioned, EVM-compatible chain on which every action in the three layers above finalises, with ML-DSA-87 and ML-DSA-65 checked natively by precompiled contracts.
The KXCO stack: the language model outside, Round Table as the logic, Guildhall and Sovereign beside each other with tokenisation inside Sovereign, and Armature underneath as the record
Exhibit 1. The language model reaches people, paper and value only through Round Table. Tokenisation sits inside Sovereign. Sources: the products page, the Sovereign page and the governance page, read on 17 October 2026.

The split decides how an engineer builds. An instrument is defined once in Round Table's model, documented in Guildhall, issued and moved in Sovereign, and recorded on Armature. Every product runs on the same core, per the products page, so the holder the register names is the party Guildhall admitted to the room and the key Armature recognises.

The division of responsibility is fixed and it is public. In the words of the Sovereign page: "Licensed institutions hold the customer assets and the regulated relationships. KXCO supplies the software and holds no customer assets." KXCO is a software company. It holds no client money and no financial licences, and every regulated act in this piece is performed by the institution that runs the environment.

Permissioned: admission closed, verification open

Only parties the operating institution has admitted can write to Armature, and the validator set is known. Reading and checking are open to everyone: the explorer and the RPC endpoint ask for no account, the ML-DSA precompiles answer anyone who calls them, and the keys that sign KXCO's records are published. Our 19 August account of the closed environment sets out the admission design in full. This section covers what it means for the engineer building on it.

Validator membership is governed on chain. A change to the set needs 3 of the 4 current validators to cast the same vote through their nodes' authenticated endpoints, and pending votes are public on the governance page, which states the set has "no admin keys, no multisig". With 4 validators, QBFT tolerates 1 faulty or malicious node, and 3 must sign each block.

Finality is deterministic. A block signed by 3 validators is final, with no forks and no reorgs, per the governance page. We measured the cadence: 59,211 blocks from block 4,951,111 to block 5,010,322 took 118,422 seconds, exactly 2.0000 seconds a block, on 7 October 2026, per the measurement record. For a register, deterministic finality means a transfer is either in a final block or it has not happened. No settlement window carries a probability.

A known set of validators and admitted participants gives an institution four things an open network cannot:

  • Counterparties in law. Every holder on the register is a party the institution admitted under its own KYC, so a position can be reported to a supervisor without a forensic exercise.
  • Final settlement. Deterministic finality removes the reorg risk that forces confirmation counts on open networks.
  • Predictable cost. Gas is near zero. On the verified path an institution writes through, KXCO pays the gas and the institution never holds a token or runs a node, per the developer note.
  • Outside checking. None of it asks the outside world to trust KXCO. A signature, an anchor or a block can be checked by anyone, from anywhere.

Identity-aware wallets, with the Travel Rule built in

A tokenised asset is a claim, and a claim needs a holder who can be named in law. Sovereign covers holding value under the holder's own keys, per the Sovereign page, and its self-custody wallet is multi-chain, on the web and as a browser extension, per the wallet's own guide. Anyone can open the live wallet today.

KYC is performed by the licensed institution, through the regulated provider it chooses, and never by KXCO. A software company with no financial licences that ran its own identity checks would be claiming a role it does not hold. The institution's result is the input. The platform binds it to a credential signed with ML-DSA, and each admitted identity is given a marker wallet on Armature, so every credentialed party has an on-chain presence from the day it is admitted, per our 19 August account.

An identity-aware wallet changes what the register can ask before a unit moves. The register can ask whether the receiving party is admitted, what class of holder it is and which jurisdiction it sits in, and it can refuse before anything is recorded. Self-custody stays: the holder's keys stay on the holder's device. Accountability stays as well: the holder is a known party, and the institution can say who holds what on any date.

The Travel Rule requires originator and beneficiary information to travel with a transfer of value between regulated parties. In the configuration for regulated institutions, Sovereign checks transfers against the rule and queues them for the compliance team where it applies. The data an institution must send with a transfer starts in the same place the transfer starts, and the compliance team reads it from the same record the register wrote.

The register evaluates the transfer rule before a unit moves

The Chair of ESMA, Verena Ross, put the question every tokenisation design has to answer on 12 June 2026: "is the DLT record the official register, or only an operational layer? Are transfers final on-chain, or only once reflected in the transfer agent's books?", per the published speech. KXCO's answer starts with the register.

In Sovereign, the register holds ownership and evaluates the transfer rule before a unit moves. The rule is written from the instrument's own documents: who may hold it, in which jurisdictions, under which lock-ups, consent requirements, holder caps and concentration limits. A transfer that fails the rule is refused before it is recorded. Nothing is unwound after settlement, because nothing that breaks the rule settles.

Here is how a rule set reads for an illustrative share class. Each condition comes from the documents, and the institution sets every value.

Illustrative. The conditions a register evaluates are written from each instrument's own documents.
ConditionIllustrative setting
Holder classProfessional investors only
JurisdictionAdmitted holders in the jurisdictions the prospectus permits
Lock-upNo transfers before the lock-up date in the subscription agreement
ConsentManager consent for any transfer above a set size
Holder capNo more than a set number of holders in the class
ConcentrationNo single holder above a set share of the class

Four attempted transfers show what the register does with it:

  • To an admitted professional investor in a permitted jurisdiction, after the lock-up. The register records it, the approval is sealed and Armature finalises the block.
  • To an address with no admitted identity behind it. Refused before anything is recorded. There is nothing to unwind.
  • To an admitted holder while the lock-up runs. Refused before anything is recorded, and the holder keeps the units.
  • To a new holder when the class is already at its cap. Refused, and the class stays inside its cap.

The capital machinery behind the register is in production: effective-dated capital tables, capital calls split as at the call date, value-dated payments, waterfall distributions, preferred return accrued on outstanding capital, and bank reconciliation that requires positive identification of the payer, per our 19 August account. The administrator prepares and the manager approves. An administrator can raise a capital call or prepare a distribution. It cannot change ownership, edit the terms of a vehicle or widen its own access.

Each change to the register finalises on Armature, and its approval is signed under a published ML-DSA key, so it stays independently verifiable. The chain carries the signed proof of each change: which approval, under which key, at which block.

Which record is the register of record is decided by the instrument's documents and the institution's regulator, and KXCO leaves that decision where it belongs. What KXCO supplies is a register that refuses a bad transfer before it happens and a chain record that is final in 2 seconds. Both of the Chair's questions then have an answer a supervisor can check without asking anyone.

Approval by name, on the approver's own device

Control in a tokenised environment comes down to one question: who approved this. On KXCO the answer is a person, by name. Round Table decides whether a proposal is allowed to become a recorded action: the action is typed, gated on its preconditions, previewed and "approved by name", per the ontology page.

The approver signs on their own device. Round Table supports passkeys: "A passkey lets you sign your own decisions with your own device. The service holds only its public half," per Round Table. The private half never leaves the approver's device, so an administrator, a vendor or a compromised server cannot approve in that person's name.

The approved entry is then sealed with Round Table's institution key, ML-DSA-87 key id d44e4b273bedf379, and consequential entries are anchored on Armature, per the published key file. We asked the chain's registry about that key on 7 October 2026 and it answered active at block 5,010,326, per the measurement record.

Agents work under the same rule. Authority handed to an agent "can only ever narrow", per our account of agent authority. An agent can prepare a transfer. It cannot approve beyond the authority it was given, and where a mistake is expensive the institution can require the party who decides and the party who executes to be two different parties.

ML-DSA-87 on chain: one call, one verdict

Armature checks ML-DSA-87 signatures with a precompiled contract, a function built into the chain, at 0x4b58434f00000000000000000000000000000087. It went live at block 4,951,111, at 08:37:11 UTC on 6 October 2026, per the block record. The first four bytes of the address spell KXCO in ASCII and the last byte names the parameter set. The ML-DSA-65 precompile at 0x0b stays live, so every signature made before the move still checks.

The input is the public key, the signature and the message, concatenated raw, with no selector, no ABI encoding and no length prefix. The output is one 32-byte word ending 01 for a valid signature and 00 for anything else. A call through eth_call costs nothing and changes nothing. Inside a transaction that checks a signature, each validator re-executes the same precompile before the block is final.

We ran it for this piece on a transfer approval, signed with ML-DSA-87 by the published npm package, at block 5,010,152 on 7 October 2026, per the measurement record. The approval reads approve: 2500 units, Fund A Class I, holder 0007 to holder 0012, rule check passed.

import { mlDsa87 } from 'kxco-post-quantum'
const P87 = '0x4b58434f00000000000000000000000000000087'
const hex = b => Buffer.from(b).toString('hex')
const ask = async data => (await (await fetch('https://api.purse.kxco.ai/rpc/armature', {
  method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
  body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'eth_call', params: [{ to: P87, data }, 'latest'] }),
})).json()).result

const key = mlDsa87.keypairFromMaster(master, 'transfer-approver-87-v1')  // master from your KMS or HSM
const approval = new TextEncoder().encode('approve: 2500 units, Fund A Class I, holder 0007 to holder 0012, rule check passed')
const sig = mlDsa87.sign(key.secretKey, approval)                         // hex, 4,627 bytes
console.log(await ask('0x' + hex(key.publicKey) + sig + hex(approval)))
valid approval                            0x...0001
one bit changed, 2500 becomes 3500        0x...0000
same input sent to the ML-DSA-65 address  0x...0000

One bit turned 2500 units into 3500 and the verdict went to 00. The ML-DSA-65 precompile refused the ML-DSA-87 input, so the two levels never cross. The developer note prints the complete code, keeps the key behind an HSM interface and writes to the chain as an institution.

The check needs no relationship with KXCO. An auditor, a supervisor or a counterparty takes the public key from the published key file, the signature from the record and the message from the document, and asks the chain. Exhibit 2 draws that path. The kxco-verify package does the same in a browser, "with no KXCO server in the trust path", per its npm page. A malformed input returns 00, never an error, per the developer note.

The verification path: a named approver signs with ML-DSA-87, the record carries the signature, and any party asks the Armature precompile for a verdict with no account
Exhibit 2. The same call answers the institution, its auditor and its supervisor, and KXCO is not in the path. Results measured on Armature on 7 October 2026, per the measurement record.

Post-quantum from genesis

Post-quantum is how Armature started. ML-DSA has signed in production from genesis, and ML-DSA-87 since 6 October 2026, per the corporate page. Three NIST standards are in use today, each where it fits.

Sources: NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205, and KXCO's pages as linked in each row, read on 7 October 2026.
StandardWhere KXCO uses itEvidence
ML-DSA, FIPS 204Approvals, register entries, credentials, anchors and evidence, checked on chain by 2 precompilesKey file and coverage page.
ML-KEM, FIPS 203ML-KEM-1024 for new keys in KXCO's npm packages and the pqc.kxco.ai vault, and hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange on the public endpointsKey file and measurement record.
SLH-DSA, FIPS 205A hash-based signature on every encrypted backup fileCoverage page.

We measured the key exchange on 7 October 2026. kxco.ai, chain.kxco.ai, verify.kxco.ai and roundtable.kxco.ai each negotiated X25519MLKEM768 with a default OpenSSL 3.5.6 client, per the measurement record. Inside the network, node traffic runs on a WireGuard overlay with ML-KEM-768-derived preshared keys, per the coverage page.

Correction, 12 October 2026: the WireGuard overlay in the paragraph above is designed for a multi-server deployment and is not deployed. Every validator runs on one server, where node traffic stays on a private network and never crosses a public one, per the coverage page.

SLH-DSA is the guard against the unexpected. It rests on hash functions alone, so if lattice cryptography were ever broken the backup signatures would still hold, per the coverage page. Every encrypted backup carries one, and any third party holding the published key can check it.

Signatures carry the larger risk for a register. Recorded traffic can be read later once a large quantum computer exists, which is the familiar threat to encryption. A signature fails differently: an attacker who recovers a private key from its public key can sign anything under it, including a transfer, a consent or a redemption instruction, and the forgery looks valid to every system that trusts the key. On a register, ownership is whatever valid signatures say it is. That is why the signatures on KXCO's approvals moved to the highest category FIPS 204 defines.

A tokenised asset outlives the key that issued it. A bond issued in 2026 with a 25-year term matures in 2051, and its issuance signature has to mean something on the day it is redeemed. The EU's coordinated roadmap sets the end of 2030 for high-risk use cases to complete the move to post-quantum cryptography, per the roadmap. Armature started post-quantum, so a register built on it starts with that move already made.

Keys rotate without breaking history. Superseded keys stay listed under the published rule "Superseded kids remain listed so historical signatures stay verifiable", per the key file. The level is bound inside each signature and read from the length of the key, so a weaker signature cannot pass for a stronger one, per Why use ML-DSA-87. NIST's validation demonstration server graded the library on 2,130 test cases with zero failures in September 2026, per KXCO's account.

Tokenisation inside Sovereign

Tokenisation at KXCO is part of Sovereign, the software institutions use to hold, exchange and settle value under common rules. It covers FX, securities, futures, options, bonds, tokens, stablecoins and cash, per the Sovereign page. An issued unit, the cash that pays for it and the distribution it earns sit in one system, under one set of rules, on one record.

Gabriel Makhlouf, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, made the case on 1 October 2026: "tokenising one aspect of the system is not enough", and the change has to include "tokenising both assets and money", per his speech. Putting tokenisation inside Sovereign does that by construction. The asset leg and the cash leg move in the same system and finalise on the same chain.

KXCO supplies the software. Licensed institutions hold the customer assets and the regulated relationships, per the Sovereign page. A fund administrator, a bank or an issuer runs tokenisation on its own licence with KXCO's software underneath.

The instrument is typed before it is issued. Round Table's ontology declares an RWA token as "a claim on a real asset", tied to its underlying asset and its legal wrapper, per the ontology page. The token carries what it represents, and the holder, the supervisor and the agent read the same definition. For each instrument the model records the claim, the legal wrapper and the asset underneath, and for each asset the custodian, the provenance and the source of its valuation. A property held for a tokenised fund is a typed thing with a custodian and a provenance, and a bond in the same sleeve carries the source of its valuation, as the ontology page shows on its tokenised fund.

A tokenised fund, start to finish

The walk-through below follows a fund unit from admission to redemption. It is general: the same sequence carries a bond, a private credit note or a property interest, with a different rule set. Each step names the party that acts, and the evidence the step leaves behind.

  1. Admit. The institution runs KYC on each investor through its regulated provider. The platform issues a signed credential, an identity-aware wallet and a marker wallet on Armature. Evidence: the credential, signed with ML-DSA.
  2. Define. The fund, its share classes and their rules are typed in Round Table's model. The prospectus, the subscription agreement and the transfer restrictions sit in Guildhall. Evidence: the sealed documents and the rule set written from them.
  3. Approve. A named officer approves the issuance on their own device with a passkey, and Round Table seals the approved entry with its ML-DSA-87 key. Evidence: the sealed entry and its anchor on Armature.
  4. Subscribe and issue. Cash arrives and is matched to an investor only on positive identification of the payer. Sovereign issues the units to the investor's wallet and the register records them. Evidence: the register entry, final on Armature in 2 seconds.
  5. Transfer. A holder asks to move units. The register evaluates the transfer rule before a unit moves: the receiver's admission and class, its jurisdiction, any lock-up, consent or cap. Travel Rule data goes with the transfer where the rule applies. Evidence: the approval, the rule result and the block.
  6. Service. The administrator values the fund exactly as it does today. Distributions run through the waterfall, and capital calls split as at the call date. Evidence: every payment, value-dated, on the record.
  7. Redeem. Units are retired against the cash leg, inside the same system. Evidence: the retirement entry and the payment, on the same chain.
  8. Prove. An auditor or a supervisor checks any signature against the published key and any anchor against the chain, without being admitted. Evidence: the chain itself, open to anyone with no account.
The life of a tokenised fund unit in 8 steps, from admission to proof, with the party that acts and the evidence each step leaves
Exhibit 3. Each step names the party that acts and the evidence it leaves. Sources: the Sovereign page, the ontology page, Round Table and our 19 August account, read on 17 October 2026.

The roles do not move. The administrator, the transfer agent and the depositary keep their roles, and the investor deals with the same institution it dealt with before. What changes is the evidence. Every step leaves a signature anyone can check and a block that is final, and the register refuses a transfer that breaks the rule before it is written.

Verifiable by anyone, readable only by those entitled

Transparency in a tokenised market has two halves, and KXCO keeps them apart. The proof is public. The content is not.

An anchor on Armature carries a digest, a fingerprint of the record, and the content stays off the chain, per our 19 August account. Selective attestation is opt-in per organisation and per event type. A supervisor sees that a record existed on a date, in a given form, sealed by a named key, and reads the record itself only when the institution grants access.

The proof can be checked without KXCO. Each key id in the published key file is the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 of its public key, so anyone can match a signature header to its key. Herald Verify lets anyone check an attestation directly through the chain's RPC, using open-source tools. The validators also attest each finalised block with their ML-DSA keys, per the governance page, and the attestation log is public on GitHub.

An auditor checking a register entry needs four steps and no help from KXCO:

  1. Read the key id from the entry's signature header.
  2. Find that key id in the published key file and note the parameter set it names.
  3. Take the SHA-256 of the payload exactly as delivered and check the ML-DSA signature over that digest, with kxco-verify or with one call to the precompiled contract.
  4. Look up the anchor's block on the explorer and the key's status at chain.kxco.ai/kids/<kid>.

The key file states the same method in its own words, so the auditor works from KXCO's published instruction and not from a conversation with KXCO.

Inside the environment, an entitled reader sees everything its entitlement covers and nothing else. A Guildhall room belongs to its Member. Guests are admitted on scoped tickets that expire, and they read watermarked, timestamped reader copies, per the Guildhall page. The same principle runs through Sovereign and Round Table: the institution decides who reads.

Control stays with the institution

KXCO builds the software and the institution runs it. The institution and its partners own the regulated service, permissions and availability, per the Sovereign page. Round Table's reasoning points at the institution's own inference endpoint, so the model weights stay inside its estate too, per the ontology page.

Keys stay with the institution. kxco-pq-hsm generates ML-DSA-87 keys on the PKCS#11 hardware security module the institution already runs, marks the private object non-extractable and signs on the token, per the developer note. Approvals happen on the approver's own device. KXCO supplies the software and holds no customer assets, per the Sovereign page.

The validator set is the institution's question too. For customers, KXCO recommends co-validation, an independent validator, or both. Validator changes need 3 of 4 on-chain votes, and every pending vote shows on the governance page before it takes effect. An institution that co-validates executes every block itself and signs as one of the set.

The records travel. Round Table exports its ledger and evidence packs under its ML-DSA-87 key, per the key file, and Armature is EVM-compatible, so Solidity, ethers and the tools an engineering team already runs work against it, per the chain's home page.

What an engineering team builds against

Everything an engineer needs to start is public and running today. The chain is EVM-compatible, the post-quantum checks are precompiles, and the libraries are on npm with the same names KXCO uses on its own estate.

Sources: the pages and packages linked in each row, read on 7 October 2026.
InterfaceWhat it doesWhere to start
Armature RPCEVM-compatible chain, ID 1111111, for Solidity, ethers and existing toolinghttps://api.purse.kxco.ai/rpc/armature and the explorer
ML-DSA-87 checkPrecompile at 0x4b58434f00000000000000000000000000000087, raw input, 01 or 00Developer note
ML-DSA-65 checkPrecompile at 0x0b, for keys made before the moveCoverage page
Signing librarykxco-post-quantum: ML-DSA-87, ML-DSA-65, ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-768 and SLH-DSAnpm
Keys in hardwarekxco-pq-hsm, the same API on a PKCS#11 tokennpm
Writing as an institutionkxco-pq-chain on the verified path, with gas paid by KXCOnpm
Accepted levelsrelay.kxco.ai/intents/v2/params lists ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87Measurement record
Key statuschain.kxco.ai/kids/<kid> reports a key as active, rotated or unknownDeveloper note
Checking without KXCOkxco-verify, in a browser, with no KXCO server in the trust pathnpm
Published keysEvery KXCO signing key, with its parameter set and historyKey file

The writes are where the institution comes in. An institution registers its own ML-DSA-87 key on Armature with proof of possession, since the new key signs its own registration, and from then on its writes carry its signature, its key id and a sequential nonce. The verifying contract reads the parameter set from the length of the key, never from a field the caller sets, per the developer note. A team can run every call in this table against the public endpoint before it signs a contract with anyone. Request a briefing and we will set up the institution key with you.

One model. The whole ecosystem.

A tokenised asset sits inside a web of parties: issuer, manager, administrator, transfer agent, depositary, custodian, investors, lenders and the assets underneath. Round Table maps that web as one model, and that is meant literally.

We showed it at sector scale on public data. Round Table resolved six seed names into 413 entities and 937 relationships, as of 7 October 2026 per the live data file. Of those 937 relationships, 883 carried a source a reader can open, per the data file on that date. The map has been available on request at Round Table Live map since 16 October 2026.

Every relationship carries its source, its basis, its confidence and the date it was true. Each claim has two time axes, when it held in the world and when it was recorded, and superseded claims are kept, so the model can be queried as at a past date, per the data file. For a tokenised fund that means look-through on demand: from the unit to the tranche, from the tranche to the reserve, the loan pool or the property, and from there to the custodian and the valuation source. The ontology page draws a tokenised fund decomposed exactly that way.

For an engineer, the ontology is the schema every layer reads. The register, the transfer rule, the approval and the agent all work from the same typed definitions. A question a risk committee once sent to a working group becomes a query, or in the page's words, "the questions that used to need a working group and three weeks become a query over the graph".

Live today, and where to check each claim

Every capability in this piece runs today. The table gives the date it went live or was measured, and a place to check it that does not ask anyone at KXCO.

Sources: as linked in each row, read or measured on 7 October 2026.
CapabilityLive since, or measuredCheck it
ML-DSA-87 checked natively on chainBlock 4,951,111, 6 October 2026Block record
ML-DSA-65 checked natively on chainPrecompile 0x0b, live beside ML-DSA-87Coverage page
7 published signing keys moved to ML-DSA-876 and 7 October 2026Key file
Hybrid ML-KEM-768 key exchangeMeasured on 4 public endpoints, 7 October 2026Measurement record
SLH-DSA on every encrypted backupLiveCoverage page
2-second blocks, deterministic finality2.0000 seconds a block, measured 7 October 2026Measurement record
Self-custody wallet, multi-chainLive on the web and as a browser extensionWallet guide
Register and capital machineryIn production19 August account
Approval by name with a passkeyLiveRound Table
The ontology at sector scale413 entities and 937 relationships, 7 October 2026Data file

Secondary markets: 2 exchanges

Issuance is half of a market. A tokenised asset needs somewhere to trade after it is issued, between parties who are admitted, under rules that hold. Two global, US-licensed exchanges will add KXCO Armature. They will be announced in late 2026; detail is available under NDA. To receive it, request a briefing.

Frequently asked questions

Is Armature a public chain or a permissioned one?

Armature is permissioned: admission closed, verification open. Only parties the operating institution admits can write, and validator changes need 3 of 4 on-chain votes. Anyone can read the chain, call the ML-DSA precompiles and check a KXCO signature against the published keys, with no account, per the governance page.

Does KXCO perform KYC?

No. KYC is performed by the licensed institution, through the regulated provider it chooses, and KXCO holds no financial licences. The institution's result is bound to a signed credential, so it follows the holder into the register, and the configuration for regulated institutions checks transfers against the Travel Rule.

The instrument's documents and the institution's regulator decide which record is the register of record. On KXCO, the register in Sovereign holds ownership and evaluates the transfer rule before a unit moves, and Armature carries the signed proof of every change, final in 2 seconds with no forks and no reorgs.

How do we call the ML-DSA-87 check from our own code?

Send eth_call to 0x4b58434f00000000000000000000000000000087 at https://api.purse.kxco.ai/rpc/armature, with the public key, the signature and the message concatenated raw. The answer ends 01 for a valid signature and 00 for anything else, and the call costs nothing. The developer note has the complete code.

Can our institution run a validator?

Yes. For customers, KXCO recommends co-validation, an independent validator, or both. A change to the validator set needs 3 of the 4 current validators to vote for it on chain, and every pending vote is public on the governance page.

Does KXCO hold client assets?

No. Licensed institutions hold the customer assets and the regulated relationships. KXCO supplies the software and holds no customer assets, per the Sovereign page.

How does KXCO change its cryptography without breaking old records?

Superseded keys stay listed in the published key file, so historical signatures keep checking, and the ML-DSA-65 precompile at 0x0b stays live beside the ML-DSA-87 one. The level is bound inside each signature. Encrypted backups also carry SLH-DSA, a hash-based signature that does not rest on lattice maths.

Which exchanges will add Armature?

Two global, US-licensed exchanges will add KXCO Armature. They will be announced in late 2026; detail is available under NDA. Request a briefing to receive it.

Start with a briefing

Bring one instrument: a fund share class, a bond, a credit note or a property interest. We will map its rules into the register, run its approval on a passkey, anchor it on Armature and show your team the ML-DSA-87 check answering on your own data. Request a briefing and we will scope it with your engineers, your risk team and your compliance officers.

Tokenise on your own licence

Your register and your keys, on a chain anyone can check. We scope it with your engineers and your risk team.

Request a briefing →Read the developer note →

Sources

  1. NIST, FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, 13 August 2024 · csrc.nist.gov
  2. NIST, FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, 13 August 2024 · csrc.nist.gov
  3. NIST, FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, 13 August 2024 · csrc.nist.gov
  4. KXCO Armature, post-quantum coverage and the ML-DSA-87 precompile from block 4,951,111 · chain.kxco.ai
  5. KXCO Armature, block 4,951,111, 6 October 2026 · chain.kxco.ai
  6. KXCO Armature, governance: QBFT, 3 of 4 votes, deterministic finality · chain.kxco.ai
  7. KXCO, published signing keys, updated 11 October 2026 · kxco.ai
  8. KXCO, Sovereign · kxco.ai
  9. KXCO, the stack: Round Table, Sovereign, Guildhall · kxco.ai
  10. KXCO, the ontology · kxco.ai
  11. KXCO, Round Table Live map data file, as of 7 October 2026 · kxco.ai
  12. KXCO, corporate: post-quantum in production from genesis · kxco.ai
  13. KXCO Round Table, passkeys · roundtable.kxco.ai
  14. Herald Verify · verify.kxco.ai
  15. KXCO, block attestation log · github.com
  16. KXCO, Sign with ML-DSA-87 on npm and get a verdict from KXCO's chain in one call, 6 October 2026 · kxco.ai
  17. KXCO, Why use ML-DSA-87, 7 October 2026 · kxco.ai
  18. KXCO, NIST graded our post-quantum cryptography · kxco.ai
  19. KXCO, Real World Asset Tokenization: Inside the KXCO Closed Environment, 19 August 2026 · kxco.ai
  20. ESMA, Verena Ross, speech at the EFAMA conference, 12 June 2026 · PDF
  21. Central Bank of Ireland, Governor Makhlouf, Irish Funds Annual Global Funds Conference, 1 October 2026 · www.centralbank.ie
  22. NIS Cooperation Group, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, June 2025 · digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu
  23. npm, kxco-verify · www.npmjs.com
  24. KXCO, measurement record for this article, 7 October 2026 · kxco.ai